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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)0),
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Appellant raises the following issues on appeal
1. Did the District Court err in finding that the insurance manual was a
"governing instrument" under Utah Code Ann, § 75-2-804?
Standard of Review: A correction of error standard reviews the legal conclusions
made by a district court for correctness without giving any deference to the legal
conclusions of the district court. R & R Indus. Park, LLC. v. Utah Prop. & Cas. Ins.
Guar.Ass'n, 199 P.3d 917, 922 (Utah 2008).
2. Did the District Court err in relying upon the documents identified as the
insurance manual and master policy when those documents had no foundation and
were not properly authenticated?
Standard of Review: A correction of evidentiary error standard reviews the legal
conclusions made by a district court for correctness without giving any deference to the
legal conclusions of the district court. State v. Whittle, 989 P.2d 52, 58 (Utah 1999); R &
R Indus. Park, LLC

v. Utah Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 199 P.3d 917, 922 (Utah

2008).
3. Did the District court err in finding that the governing instruments of the
policy contained express language preventing operation of the automatic revocation
by divorce provision of Utah Code Ann, § 75-2-804?
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Standard of Review: A correction of error standard reviews the legal conclusions
made by a district court for correctness without giving any deference to the legal
conclusions of the district court. R & R Indus. Park, L.L.C. v. Utah Prop. & Cas. Ins.
Guar. Ass% 199 P.3d 917, 922 (Utah 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

Nature of the Case.

vr*;

.. . %,.

Defendant/Appellee Maiy Beth Malloy was married to Dan Malloy on July 4,
1989. In August 1989, Dan Malloy purchased a life insurance policy through the Federal
Employees Group Life Insurance OTEGLI") in the amount of $50,000.00 (the "Policy")
and designated Mary Beth as the beneficiary of the Policy. In April 2004 Dan Malloy and
Maiy Beth were divorced. Dan Malloy did not revoke or change the designation of
beneficiary under the Policy. Dan Malloy and Rhonda were subsequently married on
June 30, 2006. Dan Malloy died on September 1, 2009. After Dan Malloy's death, Maiy
Beth received $50,000.00 as the benefit paid out under the terms of the Policy. Rhonda
thereafter demanded that Maiy Beth surrender the proceeds of the Policy to Rhonda.
Mary Beth refused to surrender the Proceeds. Rhonda, individually and as personal
representative of the Estate of Dan Malloy ("Rhonda") commenced the district court case
to recover the Proceeds paid to Maty Beth.
B*
?

Course of Proceedings.

r

i

?'.

The district court action was filed by Rhonda in the Second District Court on June

2, 2010, under case number 100904217. (R. 1-10.) The case named Appellee Mary Beth
Malloy as Defendant. The action against Maiy Beth was based on breach of contract,
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civil contempt, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing and unjust enrichment under
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-804. On June 28, 2010, Mary Beth filed an Answer in this matter.
(R. 1- ) On February 20, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 1- ).
On February 25, 2011, Maty Beth filed a response to Rhonda's Motion for Summary
Judgment and filed her own Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 1- ) On April 6, 2011,
the district court heard oral argument from both parties on their respective motions for
summary judgment. At the conclusion of the Hearing, the district court took the matter
under advisement and instructed the parties to submit supplemental memoranda
addressing the issue of preemption. (R. 227.) On April 25, 2011, Rhonda filed her
Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment and
in Opposition to Defendant's Countermotion for Summary Judgment and again objected
to the admission of the Manual and Master Policy documents as they lacked foundation
and were not authenticated. (R. 237.) On May 2, 2011, in response to Plaintiffs
Supplemental Memorandum, Mary Beth filed a Reply to Plaintiffs Supplemental
Memorandum with an Affidavit in Support of Exhibits (the "Affidavit") as an exhibit to
the memorandum. (R. 255.) On May 13, 2011, the district court entered a Memorandum
Decision denying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and granting Mary Beth's
Motion for Summary Judgment. This appeal followed.
C.

Disposition at district court or agency.

The district court found for Mary Beth and denied Rhonda's claims for relief. The
district court determined that Maty Beth was the beneficiary of the Policy and that her
divorce from Dan Malloy did not revoke the designation of beneficiary based on an
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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exception to Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-804. The district court found that the insurance
policy, the insurance manual and the beneficiaiy election form were the governing
instruments of the Policy and that the insurance manual provided an exception to § 75-2804. The district court did not reach the issue of whether a private right of action was
created by Utah statute enabling Rhonda to recover the Proceeds from Mary Beth. The
district court awarded summary judgment to Mary Beth and denied Rhondas claims for
relief. (Memorandum Decision, Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment; R. 273281.)
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The pertinent facts found by the Court are stated below: {See Memorandum
Decision, Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment; R. 273-281.):
1.

Mary Beth married DanMalloy on July 14, 1989. (R. 274.)

2.

Dan Malloy obtained an insurance policy (the "Policy") through the Federal

Employees' Group Life Insurance plan in August 1989. (R. 274.)
3.

Mary Beth was designated as the beneficiary of the Policy as of August

1989. (R. 274.)

/

4* ; Mary Beth and Dan Malloy were divorced in April 2004. (R. 274.)
5.

The Honorable Ernie W. Jones entered a Decree of Divorce (the "Decree")

dissolving the marriage of Defendant and Dan in April 2004. (R. 13-15.)
6.

The Decree provided that the Mary Beth was not awarded any part of Dan

Malloy *s retirement by stating that "...each of the parties should be awarded their own
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retirement" and that "...neither party is awarded alimony, past, present or future." (R.
13-15.)
7.

Rhonda married Dan Malloy after his divorce from Mary Beth in July

2006. (R. 274.)
8.

Dan Malloy died on September 1, 2009. (R. 274.)

9.

Dan Malloy did not change the beneficiary of the Policy prior to his death.

(R.274.)
10.

Mary Beth claimed the proceeds of the Policy, amounting to $50,000, plus

interest (the "Life Insurance Proceeds"). (R. 46.)
11.

Mary Beth received the Life Insurance Proceeds. (R. 46.)

12.

The Office of Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance paid the Life

Insurance Proceeds to Mary Beth pursuant to the most current designation of beneficiary
on file for the Policy, which was completed by Dan Malloy on August 24, 1989 (the
"Beneficiary Designation"), (R. 62.)
13.

Rhonda made demand to Mary Beth in April 2010 for the Life Insurance

Proceeds but Maiy Beth never paid the Life Insurance Proceeds to Rhonda. (R. 46.)
14.

On February 7, 2011, Rhonda moved for summary judgment in the district

court. (R. 58.)
15.

On February 22, 2011, Mary Beth responded to Rhonda's Motion for

Summaiy Judgment and filed a Countermotion for Summary Judgment. (R. 76,)
16.

On March 18, 2011, Maiy Beth filed a Reply to Plaintiffs Response to

Countermotion for Summaiy Judgment (the "Reply") wherein Maiy Beth attempted to
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introduce an exhibit purporting to be the "master policy" document without any
foundation or authentication. (R. 127.)
17.

On March 31, 2011, Rhonda filed a Motion to Strike Defendant's Reply to

Plaintiffs Response to Countermotion for Summary Judgment because of the
unsupported exhibits to Mary Beth's memoranda and because Mary Beth had raised new
issues in the reply. (R. 206.)
18.

On April 6, 2011, the district court heard oral argument on the motions for

summary judgment and Rhonda's Motion to Strike (the "Hearing"). (R. 227.)
19.

>

At the Hearing, Rhonda again raised concerns as the authenticity and

reliability of the Manual. (R. 293-14.)
20.

At the conclusion of the Hearing, the district court took the matter under

advisement and instructed the parties to submit supplemental memoranda addressing the
issue of preemption. (R. 227.)
21.

On April 25, 2011, Rhonda filed her Supplemental Memorandum in

Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendant's
Countermotion for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum). (R.
228.)
22.

In Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum, Rhonda again objected to the

admission of the Manual and Master Policy documents as they lacked foundation and
were not authenticated. (R. 237.)
23.

On May 2, 2011, in response to Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum,

Mary Beth filed a Reply to Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum. (R. 240.)
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24.

As an exhibit to her Reply to Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum, Mary

Beth filed an Affidavit in Support of Exhibits (the "Affidavit"). (R. 255.)
25.

The Affidavit did not provide any direct testimony or other support for the

Manual or Master Policy documents other than statements from counsel for Mary Beth,
Jacob W. Macfarlane that he had spoken to others about the reliability of the documents.
(R.255.)
26.

On May 13, 2011, the district court issued its Memorandum Decision

denying Rhonda's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting Mary Beth's
Countermotion for Summary Judgment. (R. 273.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This case arises out of the receipt by Defendant/Mary Beth Mary Beth Malloy of
certain life insurance proceeds paid to her as the named beneficiary of a life insurance
policy covering Dan Malloy. Mary Beth wrongfully retained the insurance proceeds
despite having been divorced from Dan Malloy six years previously. Rhonda bases her
claim to the insurance proceeds based on the automatic revocation on divorce provision
of Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-804. Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-804 operates to revoke the
beneficiary designation of an insurance policy in the event of divorce between the insured
and the beneficiary unless the "governing instruments5' of the policy dictate otherwise.
The district court erred because it found the governing instrument to be an insurance
manual rather than the policy. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 754-201 and § 75-2-802, an
insurance manual is not a governing instrument. The district court also erred because
even if the manual were a governing instrument, the document relied upon by the district
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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court that purported to be the manual was not properly authenticated and no evidence was
presented to demonstrate that the purported manual was even the manual for this relevant
insurance plan or even if it was a manual for the relevant insurance program, whether it
was the correct version of that manual. Likewise, the master policy document presented
to the district court by Mary Beth was never properly authenticated or considered by the
district court. Plaintiff properly objected to this evidence. Finally, even if the policy
document submitted by Mary Beth were properly authenticated and admitted, the Policy
does not contain provision to prevent operation of § 75-2-804.

ARGUMENT
L The District Court Erred in Finding that the Insurance Manual was a
"Governing Instrument" under Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-804.
This case arises out of the receipt by Defendant/Mary Beth Mary Beth Malloy of
certain life insurance proceeds paid to her as the named beneficiary of a life insurance
policy covering her ex-husband, Dan Malloy. Plaintiff/Appellant Rhonda Malloy was
thereafter married to Dan Malloy until his death in 2009. After Mary Beth received the
insurance proceeds, Rhonda demanded that Maiy Beth surrender the insurance proceeds
and deliver them to Rhonda. Rhonda bases her claim to the insurance proceeds on the
automatic revocation on divorce provision of Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-804. § 75-2-804

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
8 may contain errors.
Machine-generated OCR,

operates to revoke the beneficiary designation of an insurance policy in the event of
divorce between the insured and the beneficiary.1 Specifically, § 75-2-804 states that:
Except as provided by the express terms of a governing instrument, a court
order, or a contract relating to the division of the marital estate made
between the divorced individuals before or after the marriage, divorce, or
annulment, the divorce or annulment of a marriage:
(a) revokes any revocable:
i.

disposition or appointment of property made by a divorced
individual to his former spouse in a governing instrument and
any disposition or appointment created by law or in a governing
instrument to a relative of the divorced individual's former
spouse.

Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-804(2).
In general terms under the Utah Probate Code, a "governing instrument" is a
deed, will, trust, insurance or annuity policy, account with POD
designation, security registered in beneficiary form (TOD), pension, profitsharing, retirement, or similar benefit plan, instrument creating or
exercising a power of appointment or a power of attorney, or a dispositive,
appointive, or nominative instrument of any similar type.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-201(19).

Where the beneficiary designation is not revoked due to preemption by federal statute
(in this case FEGLIA), § 75-2-804 appears to create a private right of action in the case of
a divorce permitting recovery against the former spouse who has received the insurance
proceeds, as found by courts in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., In re Estate of Paid J.
Sauers, III, Deceased, 971 A.2d 1265 (Pa. Sup. 2009). The district court did not reach the
issue of whether any such private right was indeed created.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Under § 75-2-804, the definition of "governing instrument" is further refined to
include only those documents "executed by the divorced individual before the divorce or
annulment of his marriage to his former spouse." Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-804(l)(d). A
district court's interpretation of a statute is a question of law that is reviewed by the
appellate court for correctness, giving "no deference to the legal conclusions of the
district court..." R & R Indus. Park, L.L.C. v. Utah Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass% 199
P.3d917, 922 (Utah2008).
Mary Beth has acknowledged that the governing instruments in this case are the
Policy and the Designation of Beneficiaiy executed by Dan Malloy in 1989. Neither of
those documents contains the "express terms" necessary to constitute an exception to the
revocation provision of § 75-2-804. The Manual is not a "governing instrument" under §§
75-1-201 or 75-2-804. There is nothing to suggest that the Manual is anything other than
an interpretation of the Policy. To make it so would be to allow administrative
interpretation of a statutory scheme to trump a well-defined State law. Moreover, it
cannot be said the Dan Malloy "executed" the Manual at any point.
Similarly, the beneficiaiy designation form executed by Dan Malloy contains no
"express terms" that would except it from operation of § 75-2-804. Although the
beneficiaiy designation form does advise policyholders to keep designations current, it
does not expressly state that divorce will not invalidate the appointment of beneficiary
under the Policy as required § 75-2-804. The Policy likewise lacks any express language
indicating that divorce does not affect the designation of a beneficiary. What the Policy
document does contain is direction on how beneficiaries are identified. The statute at
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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issue here clearly identifies the policy and documents "executed" by the insured as the
"governing instruments." The Manual is not the policy and is not a document "executed"
by Dan Malloy and is therefore not a governing instrument. The district court erred
determining that the Manual was a "governing instrument" under § 75-2-804.
II.

The Insurance Manual and Master Policy Documents Relied Upon by the
District Court in Granting Mary Beth's Motion for Summary Judgment
Had No Foundation and Were Not Authenticated*
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires that motions for summary judgment be

supported by affidavits, depositions and responses to discovery requests. Rule 103(a) of
the Utah Rules of Evidence permits a finding of error where the error affects a substantial
right and objection is made to the offered evidence. Where documentary evidence is
relied upon by the district court in formulating its decision, evidentiary error with regard
to that evidence is reversible without deference to the district court. Merrill v. Bailey &
Sons Co., 106 P.2d 255, 258 (Utah 1940). Rule 901 of the Utah Rules of Evidence
requires that documentary evidence be authenticated prior to admission. Utah Rules of
Evidence 901(a). In her Motion for Summary Judgment to the district court, Mary Beth
submitted copies of what purport to be the master policy document and the insurance
manual. Rhonda, in memoranda and before the district court at oral argument, objected to
these documents as inadmissible for failing to adhere to the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Mary Beth submitted the Manual and Master Policy to the district court without
providing any foundation for that document. There was no supporting affidavit or other
appropriate evidence demonstrating the reliability of those documents. There was simply
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no admissible evidence or testimony before the district court that provided any
foundation for the Manual or the Master Policy documents.
There is likewise no evidence that the Manual in its current iteration bears any
relationship or similarities to the policy that was purchased by Dan Malloy more than
twenty years ago. There is no evidence demonstrating that the Manual of any vintage is
indeed a fair representation of the Policy such that it would constitute a "governing
instrument/' Only after Rhonda objected to the documents for a third time in her
Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment did Mary Beth
attempt to offer any foundation for the objectionable documents. However, that was
accomplished by way of an affidavit from Maty Beth's counsel that only alleged that
counsel had verbal assurances from third parties that the documents were what Mary
Beth claims they are. There was no testimony offered from those third parties, and the
statements contained in counsel's affidavit are inadmissible under Utah Rule of Evidence
802.
The district court's reliance on the Manual affects the substantial right of Rhonda
to the proceeds of the life insurance policy of Dan Malloy. It was primarily the Manual
upon which the district court relied in rendering its decision. Because the district court
relied on the Manual, which was afflicted with evidentiaiy problems, and because the
district court's reliance on that Manual affects a substantial right of Rhonda, the district
court's decision must be overturned and this matter remanded to the district court.
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HI.

The Governing Instruments of the Policy Contain No Express Language
Preventing the Automatic Revocation by Divorce Provisions of Utah Code
Ann. § 75-2-804.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-804(2) states that:
Except as provided by the express terms of a governing instrument, a court
order, or a contract relating to the division of the marital estate made
between the divorced individuals before or after the marriage, divorce, or
annulment, the divorce or annulment of a marriage:
(a) revokes any revocable:

i

i.

*

disposition or appointment of property made by a divorced
individual to his former spouse in a governing instrument and
any disposition or appointment created by law or in a
governing instrument to a relative of the divorced individual's
•"•'•* former spouse.

It should go without saying that express terms are those terms that are express, not
implied. Section 75-2-804 also clarifies, for the purposes of revocation upon divorce,
"governing instrument means a governing instrument executed by the divorced individual
before the divorce or annulment of this marriage to his former spouse." Thus, the
governing instruments here are limited to the Policy and Designation of Beneficiary. In
those governing instruments, there are no express terms that would render § 75-2-804
inoperative.
The only express term contemplated by § 75-2-804 is found in the Manual. As
noted above, the Manual as presented to the district court suffered from evidentiary
defects that subject the district court's decision to reversal. Also as noted above, the
Manual is not a governing instrument. The Policy, which the parties have agreed is a
governing instrument, lacks any express language indicating that divorce does not affect
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the designation of a beneficiary. What the Policy document does contain is direction on
how beneficiaries are identified.
Underlying this matter is the fact that it was Congress' intention to streamline the
process of payment of benefits under FEGLI policies that primarily drives the designation
provisions. O'Neal v. Gonzalez, 839 F.2d 1437, 1440 (11th Cir. 1988). This is not to say
that FEGLIA has no interest in identifying the correct beneficiaries of the insurance
benefits under its umbrella. For example, built in to FEGLIA is a mechanism to allow
changes to beneficiaries by submission of a court order to the employing agency prior to
the death of the covered individual. 5 U.S.C. § 8705. Nevertheless, FEGLIA has been
structured to achieve administrative efficiency in order that benefits may be paid out
without subjecting the administrator to liability and litigation over who was paid and who
should have been paid. In fact, § 75-2-804 specifically absolves a third-party payor of
liability for payments to individuals who should otherwise have received benefits had the
payor received written notice. Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-804(7)(a). It is only after the
payor has paid that § 75-2-804 becomes important. Notable too is the purpose of § 75-2804. Such statutes exist to effectuate the presumption that a policyholder does not want
to benefit his former spouse, and would have likely changed the beneficiary designation
had it occurred to him to do so. Stillman v. TIAA-CREF, 343 F.3d 1311, 1314 (10th Cir.
2003). There is no reason that a former spouse should assume that an expectation interest
is protected, and § 75-2-804 provides a method to accomplish this without imposing any
duty on FEGLI or otherwise affecting the operation of FEGLIA,
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In short, there is nothing in the Policy or the Designation of Beneficiary that
qualifies as "express terms'5 that would render § 75-2-804 ineffective, and in fact § 75-2804 supplements FEGLIA in that it provides a means for proper distribution of proceeds
after FEGLI has accomplished its purpose of administrative efficiency and speed in
paying benefits. The result is that the Court of Appeals should vacate the judgment
against Rhonda denying her claims and remand to the district court.

CONCLUSION
As set forth above, the Court of Appeals should reverse the district court's
conclusion that Mary Beth was the beneficiary of the Policy and that her divorce from
Dan Malloy did not revoke the designation of beneficiary. The Court of Appeals should
also reverse the district court's conclusion that the insurance policy, the insurance manual
and the beneficiary election form were the governing instruments of the Policy. Upon
reversing that legal conclusion by the district court, the Court of Appeals should vacate
the judgment against Rhonda denying her claims.
Even if insurance manual was a "governing instrument" the Court of Appeals
should reverse the district court's decision because that document and the master policy
were not properly authenticated. Upon making the determination that the documents
offered to support Mary Beth's Motion for Summary Judgment were not properly
authenticated and admitted, the Court of Appeals should vacate the judgment against
Rhonda denying her claims and remand to the district court.
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ADDENDUM
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75-1-102. Purposes -- Rule of construction.
(1) This code shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying
purposes and policies.
(2) The underlying purposes and policies of this code are:
(a) To simplify and clarify the law concerning the affairs of decedents, missing
persons, protected persons, minors, and incapacitated persons;
(b) To discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of his
property;
(c) To promote a speedy and efficient system for administering the estate of the
decedent and making distribution to his successors;
(d) To facilitate use and enforcement of certain trusts; and
(e) To make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
Enacted by Chapter 150, 1975 General Session
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75-1-201. General definitions.
Subject to additional definitions contained in the subsequent chapters that are
applicable to specific chapters, parts, or sections, and unless the context otherwise
requires, in this code:
(1) "Agent" includes an attorney-in-fact under a durable or nondurable power of
attorney, an individual authorized to make decisions concerning another's health care, and
an individual authorized to make decisions for another under a natural death act.
(2) "Application" means a written request to the registrar for an order of informal
probate or appointment under Title 75, Chapter 3, Part 3, Informal Probate and
Appointment Proceedings.
(3) "Beneficiary," as it relates to trust beneficiaries, includes a person who has any
present or future interest, vested or contingent, and also includes the owner of an interest
by assignment or other transfer; as it relates to a charitable trust, includes any person
entitled to enforce the trust; as it relates to a "beneficiary of a beneficiary designation,"
refers to a beneficiary of an insurance or annuity policy, of an account with POD
designation, of a security registered in beneficiary form (TOD), or of a pension, profitsharing, retirement, or similar benefit plan, or other nonprobate transfer at death; and, as
it relates to a "beneficiary designated in a governing instrument," includes a grantee of a
deed, a devisee, a trust beneficiary, a beneficiary of a beneficiary designation, a donee,
appointee, or taker in default of a power of appointment, and a person in whose favor a
power of attorney or a power held in any individual, fiduciary, or representative capacity
is exercised.
(4) "Beneficiary designation" refers to a governing instrument naming a beneficiary of
an insurance or annuity policy, of an account with POD designation, of a security
registered in beneficiary form (TOD), or of a pension, profit-sharing, retirement, or
similar benefit plan, or other nonprobate transfer at death,
(5) "Child" includes any individual entitled to take as a child under this code by
intestate succession from the parent whose relationship is involved and excludes any
person who is only a stepchild, a foster child, a grandchild, or any more remote
descendant.
(6) "Claims," in respect to estates of decedents and protected persons, includes
liabilities of the decedent or protected person, whether arising in contract, in tort, or
otherwise, and liabilities of the estate which arise at or after the death of the decedent or
after the appointment of a conservator, including funeral expenses and expenses of
administration. "Claims" does not include estate or inheritance taxes, or demands or
disputes regarding title of a decedent or protected person to specific assets alleged to be
included in the estate.
(7) "Conservator" means a person who is appointed by a court to manage the estate of
a protected person.
(8) "Court" means any of the courts of record in this state having jurisdiction in
matters relating to the affairs of decedents.
(9) "Descendant" of an individual means all of his descendants of all generations, with
the relationship of parent and child at each generation being determined by the definition
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of child and parent contained in this title.
(10) "Devise," when used as a noun, means a testamentary disposition of real or
personal property and, when used as a verb, means to dispose of real or personal property
by will.
(11) "Devisee" means any person designated in a will to receive a devise. For the
purposes of Title 75, Chapter 3, Probate of Wills and Administration, in the case of a
devise to an existing trust or trustee, or to a trustee in trust described by will, the trust or
trustee is the devisee,
and the beneficiaries are not devisees.
(12) "Disability" means cause for a protective order as described by Section 75-5-401.
(13) "Distributee" means any person who has received property of a decedent from his
personal representative other than as a creditor or purchaser. A testamentary trustee is a
distributee only to the extent of distributed assets or increment thereto remaining in his
hands. A beneficiary of a testamentary trust to whom the trustee has distributed property
received from a personal representative is a distributee of the personal representative. For
purposes of this provision, "testamentary trustee" includes a trustee to whom assets are
transferred by will, to the extent of the devised assets.
(14) "Estate" includes the property of the decedent, trust, or other person whose affairs
are subject to this title as originally constituted and as it existsfromtime to time during
administration.
(15) "Exempt property" means that property of a decedent's estate which is described
in Section 75-2-403.
(16) "Fiduciary" includes a personal representative, guardian, conservator, and trustee.
(17) "Foreign personal representative" means a personal representative of another
jurisdiction.
(18) "Formal proceedings" means proceedings conducted before a judge with notice to
interested persons.
(19) "Governing instrument" means a deed, will, trust, insurance or annuity policy,
account with POD designation, security registered in beneficiary form (TOD), pension,
profit-sharing, retirement, or similar benefit plan, instrument creating or exercising a
power of appointment or a power of attorney, or a dispositive, appointive, or nominative
instrument of any similar type.
(20) "Guardian" means a person who has qualified as a guardian of a minor or
incapacitated person pursuant to testamentary or court appointment, or by written
instrument as provided in Section 75-5-202.5, but excludes one who is merely a guardian
ad litem.
(21) "Heirs," except as controlled by Section 75-2-711, means persons, including the
surviving spouse and state, who are entitled under the statutes of intestate succession to
the property of a decedent.
(22) "Incapacitated person" means any person who is impaired by reason of mental
illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or disability, chronic use of drugs, chronic
intoxication, or other cause, except minority, to the extent of lacking sufficient
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understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions.
(23) "Informal proceedings" mean those conducted without notice to interested
persons by an officer of the court acting as a registrar for probate of a will or appointment
of a personal representative.
(24) "Interested person" includes heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors,
beneficiaries, and any others having a property right in or claim against a trust estate or
the estate of a decedent, ward, or protected person. It also includes persons having
priority for appointment as personal representative, other fiduciaries representing
interested persons, a settlor of a trust, if living, or the settlor's legal representative, if any,
if the settlor is living but incapacitated. The meaning as it relates to particular persons
may vary from time to time and shall be determined according to the particular purposes
of, and matter involved in, any proceeding,
(25) "Issue" of a person means descendant as defined in Subsection (9).
(26) "Joint tenants with the right of survivorship" and "community property with the
right of survivorship" includes coowners of property held under circumstances that entitle
one or more to the whole of the property on the death of the other or others, but excludes
forms of coownership registration in which the underlying ownership of each party is in
proportion to that party's contribution.
(27) "Lease" includes an oil, gas, or other mineral lease.
(28) "Letters" includes letters testamentary, letters of guardianship, letters of
administration, and letters of conservatorship.
(29) "Minor" means a person who is under 18 years of age.
(30) "Mortgage" means any conveyance, agreement, or arrangement in which property
is used as security.
(31) "Nonresident decedent" means a decedent who was domiciled in another
jurisdiction at the time of his death.
(32) "Organization" includes a corporation, limited liability company, business trust,
estate, trust, partnership, joint venture, association, government or governmental
subdivision or agency, or any other legal or commercial entity.
(33) "Parent" includes any person entitled to take, or who would be entitled to take if
the child died without a will, as a parent under this code by intestate succession from the
child whose relationship is in question and excludes any person who is only a stepparent,
foster parent, or grandparent.
(34) "Payor" means a trustee, insurer, business entity, employer, government,
governmental agency or subdivision, or any other person authorized or obligated by law
or a governing instrument to make payments.
(35) "Person" means an individual or an organization.
(36) (a) "Personal representative1' includes executor, administrator, successor personal
representative, special administrator, and persons who perform substantially the same
function under the law governing their status.
(b) "General personal representative" excludes special administrator.
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(37) "Petition11 means a written request to the court for an order after notice.
(38)f'Proceeding" includes action at law and suit in equity.
(39) "Property" includes both real and personal property or any interest therein and
means anything that may be the subject of ownership.
(40) "Protected person" means a person for whom a conservator has been appointed. A
"minor protected person" means a minor for whom a conservator has been appointed
because of minority,
(41) "Protective proceeding" means a proceeding described in Section 75-5-401,
(42) "Record" means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is
stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.
(43) "Registrar" refers to the official of the court designated to perform the functions
of registrar as provided in Section 75-1-307.
(44) "Security" includes any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of
indebtedness, certificate of interest, or participation in an oil, gas, or mining title or lease
or in payments out of production under such a title or lease, collateral trust certificate,
transferable share, voting trust certificate, and, in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a security, or any certificate of interest or participation, any
temporary or interim certificate,
receipt, or certificate of deposit for, or any warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase,
any of the
foregoing.
^
(45) "Settlement," in reference to a decedent's estate, includes the full process of
administration, distribution, and closing.
(46) "Sign" means, with present intent to authenticate or adopt a record other than a
will:
(a) to execute or adopt a tangible symbol; or
(b) to attach to or logically associate with the record an electronic symbol, sound, or
process.
(47) "Special administrator" means a personal representative as described in
Sections 75-3-614 through 75-3-618.
(48) "State" means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, any territory or insular possession subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, or a Native American tribe or band recognized by
federal law or formally acknowledged by a state.
(49) "Successor personal representative" means a personal representative, other than a
special administrator, who is appointed to succeed a previously appointed personal
representative.
(50) "Successors" means persons, other than creditors, who are entitled to property of
a decedent under the decedent's will or this title.
(51) "Supervised administration" refers to the proceedings described in Title 75,
Chapter 3, Part 5, Supervised Administration.
(52) "Survive," except for purposes of Part 3 of Article VI, Uniform TOD Security
Registration Act, means that an individual has neither predeceased an event, including the
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death of another individual, nor is considered to have predeceased an event under
Section 75-2-104 or 75-2-702. The term includes its derivatives, such as "survives,"
"survived," "survivor," and "surviving."
(53) "Testacy proceeding" means a proceeding to establish a will or determine
intestacy.
(54) "Testator" includes an individual of either sex.
(55) "Trust" includes a health savings account, as defined in Section 223, Internal
Revenue Code, any express trust, private or charitable, with additions thereto, wherever
and however created. The term also includes a trust created or determined by judgment or
decree under which the trust is to be administered in the manner of an express trust. The
term excludes other constructive trusts, and it excludes resulting trusts, conservatorships,
personal representatives, trust accounts as defined in Title 75, Chapter 6, Nonprobate
Transfers, custodial arrangements pursuant to any Uniform Transfers To Minors Act,
business trusts providing for certificates to be issued to beneficiaries, common trust
funds, voting trusts, preneed funeral plans under Title 58, Chapter 9, Funeral Services
Licensing Act, security arrangements, liquidation trusts, and trusts for the primary
purpose of paying debts, dividends, interest, salaries, wages, profits, pensions, or
employee benefits of any kind, and any arrangement under which a person is nominee or
escrowee for another.
(56) "Trustee" includes an original, additional, and successor trustee, and cotrustee,
whether or not appointed or confirmed by the court.
(57) "Ward" means a person for whom a guardian has been appointed. A "minor
ward" is a minor for whom a guardian has been appointed solely because of minority.
(58) "Will" includes codicil and any testamentary instrument which merely appoints
an
executor, revokes or revises another will, nominates a guardian, or expressly excludes or
limits the right of an individual or class to succeed to property of the decedent passing by
intestate succession.
Amended by Chapter 93, 2010 General Session
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75-2-804. Definitions - Revocation of probate and nonprobate transfers by
divorce -- Effect of severance -- Revival - Protection of payors, third parties, and
bonafidepurchasers — Personal liability of recipient - No revocation by other
changes of circumstances.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Disposition or appointment of property" includes a transfer of an item of property
or any other benefit to a beneficiary designated in a governing instrument.
(b) "Divorce or annulment" means any divorce or annulment, or any dissolution or
declaration of invalidity of a marriage, that would exclude the spouse as a surviving
spouse within the meaning of Section 75-2-802. A decree of separation that does not
terminate the status of husband and wife is not a divorce for purposes of this section.
(c) "Divorced individual" includes an individual whose marriage has been annulled.
(d) "Governing instrument" means a governing instrument executed by the divorced
individual before the divorce or annulment of his marriage to his former spouse.
(e) "Relative of the divorced individual's former spouse" means an individual who is
related to the divorced individual's former spouse by blood, adoption, or affinity and
who, after the divorce or annulment, is not related to the divorced individual by blood,
adoption, or affinity.
(f) "Revocable," with respect to a disposition, appointment, provision, or nomination,
means one under which the divorced individual, at the time of the divorce or annulment,
was alone empowered, by law or under the governing instrument, to cancel the
designation in favor of his former spouse or former spouse's relative, whether or not the
divorced individual was then empowered to designate himself in place of his former
spouse or in place of his former spouse's relative and whether or not the divorced
individual then had the capacity to exercise the power.
(2) Except as provided by the express terms of a governing instrument, a court order,
or a contract relating to the division of the marital estate made between the divorced
individuals before or after the marriage, divorce, or annulment, the divorce or annulment
of a marriage:
(a) revokes any revocable:
(i) disposition or appointment of property made by a divorced individual to his former
spouse in a governing instrument and any disposition or appointment created by law or in
a governing instrument to a relative of the divorced individual's former spouse;
(ii) provision in a governing instrument conferring a general or nongeneral power of
appointment on the divorced individual's former spouse or on a relative of the divorced
individual's former spouse; and
(iii) nomination in a governing instrument, nominating a divorced individual's former
spouse or a relative of the divorced individual's former spouse to serve in any fiduciary or
representative capacity, including a personal representative, executor, trustee,
conservator, agent, or guardian; and
(b) severs the interests of the former spouses in property held by them at the time of
the divorce or annulment as joint tenants with the right of survivorship, transforming the
interests of the former spouses into tenancies in common.
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(3) A severance under Subsection (2)(b) does not affect any third-party interest in
property acquired for value and in good faith reliance on an apparent title by survivorship
in the survivor of the former spouses unless a writing declaring the severance has been
noted, registered, filed, or recorded in records appropriate to the kind and location of the
property which are relied upon, in the ordinary course of transactions involving such
property, as evidence of ownership.
(4) Provisions of a governing instrument are given effect as if the former spouse and
relatives of the former spouse disclaimed all provisions revoked by this section or, in the
case of a revoked nomination in a fiduciary or representative capacity, as if the former
spouse and relatives of the former spouse died immediately before the divorce or
annulment.
(5) Provisions revoked solely by this section are revived by the divorced individual's
remarriage to the former spouse or by a nullification of the divorce or annulment.
(6) No change of circumstances other than as described in this section and in
Section 75-2-803 effects a revocation.
(7) (a) A payor or other third party is not liable for having made a payment or
transferred an item of property or any other benefit to a beneficiary designated in a
governing instrument affected by a divorce, annulment, or remarriage, or for having
taken any other action in good faith reliance on the validity of the governing instrument,
before the payor or other third party received written notice of the divorce, annulment, or
remarriage. A payor or other third party is liable for a payment made or other action
taken after the payor or other third party received written notice of a claimed forfeiture or
revocation under this section.
(b) Written notice of the divorce, annulment, or remarriage under Subsection (7)(a)
shall be mailed to the payor's or other third party's main office or home by registered or
certified mail, return receipt requested, or served upon the payor or other third party in
the same manner as a summons in a civil action. Upon receipt of written notice of the
divorce, annulment, or remarriage, a payor or other third party may pay any amount owed
or transfer or deposit any item of property held by it to or with the court having
jurisdiction of the probate proceedings relating to the decedent's estate or, if no
proceedings have been commenced, to or with the court having jurisdiction of probate
proceedings relating to the decedent's estates located in the county of the decedent's
residence. The court shall hold the funds or item of property and, upon its determination
under this section, shall order disbursement or transfer in accordance with the
determination. Payments, transfers, or deposits made to or with the court discharge the
payor or other third party from all claims for the value of amounts paid to or items of
property transferred to or deposited with the court.
(8) (a) A person who purchases property from a former spouse, relative of a former
spouse, or any other person for value and without notice, or who receives from a former
spouse, relative of a former spouse, or any other person a payment or other item of
property in partial or full satisfaction of a legally enforceable obligation, is neither
obligated under this section to return the payment, item of property, or benefit nor is
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liable under this section for the amount of the payment or the value of the item of
property or benefit. But a former spouse, relative of a former spouse, or other person
who, not for value, received a payment, item of property, or any other benefit to which
that person is not entitled under this section is obligated to return the payment, item of
property, or benefit, or is personally liable for the amount of the payment or the value of
the item of property or benefit, to the person who is entitled to it under this section.
(b) If this section or any part of this section is preempted by federal law with respect
to a payment, an item of property, or any other benefit covered by this section, a former
spouse, relative of the former spouse, or any other person who, not for value, received a
payment, item of property, or any other benefit to which that person is not entitled under
this section is obligated to return that payment, item of property, or benefit, or is
personally liable for the amount of the payment or the value of the item of property or
benefit, to the person who would have been entitled to it were this section or part of this
section not preempted.
Repealed and Re-enacted by Chapter 39,1998 General Session
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